We report 28 new experiment sessions consisting of up to three experience levels to examine the robustness of learning and 'error' elimination by participants in a laboratory asset market and its effect on price bubbles. Our answer to the title question is: "yes."
the form of cash endowments (see King et al. [1993] , Caginalp et al. [1998] ). It should be emphasized, however, that in all cases asset prices in these markets converge across experience levels to the intrinsic rational fundamental value of the asset. 4 Hence, equilibrium theory, which says nothing about the process and speed of equilibrium convergence, is not contradicted by this evidence. What has been falsified is the hypothesis that all information relevant to share value is immediately incorporated into its trading price by consciously rational calculation and action by traders based on the information they are provided before trading begins.
There are several treatments that seem to lessen the effects of a bubble such as introducing a futures market or constraining opening market prices (at the beginning of the asset's life) to occur near fundamental value (see Porter and Smith [1995] , Caginalp et al. [2000] , Noussair and Tucker [2006] ). But the only condition that has reliably eliminated price bubbles in these environments and yielded convergence toward fundamental value is increased experience in the same environment. In particular, SSW and subsequent replications found that common group experience, that is, the same cohort of traders, who can see they are the same, causes trading to thin out and contract prices to converge toward fundamental value by the third replication of the market. For example, Figure 2 shows a common time series pattern over a 15-period horizon for the same cohort of traders in three trading sessions, from inexperienced to twice-experienced. 4 However, in Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore [2005] , their environment generates price bubbles that do not converge but grow throughout the time horizon. In Figure 1 we provide a graph of the average contract prices in their experiments for different levels of experience. These results differ markedly from the typical asset market experiment price pattern of a bubble and subsequent crash to fundamental value or the twice-experienced result of prices at fundamental value over most of the horizon. This suggests that the character of an asset market price bubble is directly related to the environment's parameters.
Note that both the deviation of mean contract prices from fundamental value and the trading volume decline with experience. Moreover, Porter and Smith [1995] found that there is an interaction between experience and the variance of the dividend distribution.
For example, when the per-period dividend is certain, it takes only once-experienced subjects to eliminate a price bubble. Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore [2005] (hereafter referred to as DLM) report experiments in single sessions in which a cohort of six subjects participate in a sequence of 4 ten-period standard asset markets with identical initial parameters. In their fourth 10-period market, either 2 or 4 of the six experienced subjects are randomly selected and replaced with inexperienced subjects. They find that with these levels of inexperienced subjects, trading occurs at levels similar to those of twice experienced cohorts. However, their results are not directly comparable with those reported in SSW because of key differences in experimental design: SSW's experiments used more traders (9-12) in longer (15 period) horizons with a dividend distribution with four potential outcomes and subjects who returned in separate experienced sessions.
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But the results reported by DLM establish that there does exist an environment in which identical cohort interaction may not be necessary for experience to achieve its diminishing effect on a bubble. In a given asset market environment, repetition (experience) for as little as one-third of the six subjects yielded trade similar to that of 5 DLM point out that both SSW and Petersen [1993] conducted some mixed experience asset market experiments with varied results. In addition, King et al. [1993] used insiders and found that the bubbles remained and sometimes did not crash if short-selling was allowed, however, Haruvy and Noussair [2006] find that short selling can moderate bubbles. experienced cohorts. Because of differences in the economic environment and procedures this is not inconsistent with the small sample of experiments reported in SSW also showing that bubbles were dampened in groups composed of a larger proportion of experienced relative to inexperienced subjects.
In addition to the negative correlation between bubbles and experience, 'errors' 6 in decision making by subjects have been observed; i.e., it has been posited that 'confusion,'
or mistaken understanding and analysis of the asset trading environment, leads to 'irrationality' at the individual level that is associated with bubbles (Lei et al. [2001] processes that explain what they do, how they adapt, and why they eventually converge.
We do know that in asset trading (and many other) environments experience reduces error, where 'error' is defined as the discrepancy between predicted and observed behavior. For this reason we prefer to use the word 'error' rather than 'confusion' in referring to such discrepancies.
In this paper, we will examine the robustness of market experience. In particular, we ask the question: Can a price bubble be rekindled with twice-experienced subjects? If twiceexperienced subjects can be induced to trade at price levels and volumes similar to less experienced subjects, then the robustness of being twice experienced in eliminating bubbles is challenged. Our basic approach in the design used here is to simply retool it using earlier results showing that bubbles are exacerbated by yield (dividend) uncertainty and by available liquidity, and apply such treatments to twice-experienced subjects. If one thinks of great stock market booms as driven by waves of new technology, such environments introduce new sources of unpredictable yield uncertainty, and parallel with this development we see much new liquidity attracted into equity investment. Thus, we insert these two conditions to measure their ability to rekindle bubbles among twiceexperienced subjects. We also draw on widespread experimental evidence that 'learning'
(qua adaptation) is context (environment) dependent and does not effectively transfer quickly to altered environments. This in itself also suggests that subjects do not think about their task, and generalize from it, the way we do using economic reasoning.
I Experimental Design
Our experiment environment uses the canonical asset market form in which a security with a finite life of 15 periods is traded. 7 The asset pays a random dividend drawn from a fixed distribution each period. In our baseline experiments, the dividend distribution was uniform over the four potential outcomes {0,8,28,60} in cents. Thus, the expected dividend payout each period was 24 cents. Over a 15-period horizon, the asset should begin at a fundamental value of 360 and decline by 24 each period. In addition to this asset value structure, each subject was endowed with an initial portfolio of shares and 7
We used a conventional uniform price sealed bid-offer call market institution to reallocate shares from sellers to buyers each period at one market clearing price. We are comfortable with studies showing that call markets exhibit bubble properties equivalent to those of the continuous double auction in comparisons using the same asset market environment (see Van Boening et al. [1993] , Caginalp et al. [2000] and Haruvy et al. [2007] ).
cash. We use three portfolio types that we spread evenly across subjects. Table 1 lists these three portfolio types. Thus, the average portfolio consisted of 4 shares and 720 in cash. 8 We call this environment the baseline.
Within the baseline environment, we developed specific protocols of subject experience following SSW. We recruited subject cohorts from the undergraduate population at
George Mason University who participated in the baseline market and then each group was brought back for a second experiment. We refer to these two sessions as the baseline sessions. We cycled five cohorts through two sessions each, so that each cohort had one session as inexperienced traders and the second as once-experienced traders. We then took this pool of 70 once-experienced subjects and mixed them for a third session. In this way we had a set of once-experienced subjects in cohorts in which the subjects could see that the composition of their group was not identical to the groups they had been in before. In addition to mixing the subjects, we changed two other environment variables that have been shown to increase the severity of a bubble. Specifically, we increased the variance of the dividend distribution and increased liquidity in the market by lowering the initial number of shares and increasing the amount of cash . We call this the rekindle treatment. Dividends were now drawn with equal probabilities for each of five potential outcomes {0,1,8,28,98} so that the one-period expected dividend value was 27. The change in the initial portfolio of cash and shares was set so that the cash positions were doubled and the outstanding stock was cut in half. Table 2 shows the portfolio values for the rekindle treatment.
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To avoid any misunderstanding we want to emphasize that our rekindle environment is not one that is tweaked only moderately or slightly. We double the cash endowments and halve the share endowments in rekindle relative to baseline. We also (slightly) increase the per-period expected dividend, but increase substantially its variance, from 715 to 1966. Hence, we shock the environment using twice previously experienced subjects from the baseline environment to see if we can rekindle a bubble in spite of that experience. We have not supposed that re-ignition with highly experienced subjects would be easy. The experiments are deliberately designed to push the edge of what has been the conventional learning-an important unique function of lab experiments. We think the cited earlier studies have discovered how to 'reliably' get equilibrium behavior.
The question herein is how robust is that finding: we are asking if being twice previously experienced will dampen, arrest, or modify trading away from dividend value under the shock.
In advance of doing the experiments we (and no one) could say what kinds of changes it would take to empirically identify conditions under which subjects behaved as if they were in a different game. For making these comparisons we draw on a data base of experiments (see Table 3 ) we conducted over the years with a standard 15-period market 9
The large changes are not in expected portfolio value but in the hypothesized neutral mix of cash and share endowments and the range/variance of the (roughly mean preserving) distribution of dividends.
in which experienced sessions are with same subject cohorts in a constant environment, and therefore are in a position to provide an answer to this question.
From the 5 baseline sessions with 70 subjects, we conducted 3 rekindle sessions with a total of 33 subjects. We also conducted two independent series of replication experiments, each with three sessions. These were identical to the baseline experiments except for the presence of a third session, in which twice-experienced subjects returned for a third time with the same cohort of traders and same environment. This was done in order to replicate the results in SSW with our subject pool. This procedure is intended to control for any inference error due to the possibility that our results in the rekindle experiments reflect sampling peculiarities in our subject pool. Finally, in addition to the baseline, rekindle, and replication sessions, we recruited 45 more subjects to participate in a set of replication experiments with rekindle parameters, termed new replication. Specifically, we set up three experiments with three sessions each. Each experiment had a cohort of fifteen subjects who, as in SSW, went through the three sessions (experiences) together. The parameters for all sessions were static and equivalent to the rekindle parameters. This design allowed us to observe the bubble pattern across all three experience levels holding the rekindle environment constant throughout.
II.
Experimental Results Figure 4 shows the three rekindle experiment price time series along with the two twiceexperienced cohorts using our baseline parameters. It is clear from this chart that there is a difference between the rekindle treatment and the twice-experienced subjects in the replication treatment (with baseline parameters). Figure 5 
where P t is the market price in period t, f t is the fundamental value of the asset in period t, and E is the expected dividend value over the life of the asset.
2.
Duration: this variable measures the length, in periods, in which there is an observed increase in market prices relative to fundamental value. Formally,
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We are grateful to one of our referees for urging us to conduct these additional comparison experiments the results of which modified and extended our initial conclusions based only on the rekindle treatment. 
A priori there might be good reason to be skeptical of this empirical analysis: there exists no general way to represent a time path of observations with a scalar variable. We use four scalars, but these time paths have important empirical characteristics that belie generality. Empirically bubble paths are extinguished over time and show regularities in their pattern: the normalized price amplitude, which tends to be single-peaked, declines with experience; the corresponding turning point periods tend to be single valued and to decline with experience; turnover on average declines monotonically with experience.
Although individual measures of each element in this 4-tuple are subject to high sampling variability, this quality in their regularity tends to be preserved. This is particularly captured in Figure 2 , which, however, does not illustrate the sampling variability. The relatively large sample of experiments in the data base we report in Table 3 is important in reducing the standard error of this sampling variability. Hence, much of the information content of a bubble is captured in these four scalar reductions. Moreover, this regularity is part of the theoretical challenge that needs to be explained by the appropriate dynamic financial model.
For the regression analysis below, in addition to the 28 experiment sessions described above, we use the results from 53 previous 15-period asset market experiments with inexperienced, once-experienced and twice-experienced subjects in the baseline environment (the data come from SSW, Caginalp et al. [2000] , King et al. [1993] , Van Boening et al. [1993] and Caginalp et al. [2001] ). Across all the data, if experience is robust we should find that the characteristics of the rekindle treatment should be equivalent to the twice-experienced treatments and bubbling should diminish with experience in the new replication treatments. Also the rekindle and twice experienced new replication should be comparable. In Table 5 we provide the appropriate pairwise comparisons.
We estimate the following seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR): Where i denotes the session, the independent variables are {0,1}dummy variables denoting the treatment, and β jk is a coefficient denoting treatment j and measurement k.
The results of SUR estimates are provided in Table 4 . The estimates from this table allow us to conclude:
Result 1: Experience reduces the amplitude of a bubble significantly. However, experience with the rekindle treatment results in a bubble amplitude that is no different than the amplitude of inexperienced subjects. Moreover, relative to twice-experienced cohorts, rekindle has a greater amplitude.
In addition to the t-statistics derived from the SUR regressions, Table 5 provides the results of the Exact Wilcoxon Rank sum test for the null hypothesis that the rekindle amplitude is the same as inexperienced versus the two-sided alternative with W=49, n=3, m=34, p-value= 0.6532; for rekindle versus twice-experienced it is W=30, n=3, m=8, pvalue=0.0121. This result shows that an environment-specific type of experience is required in this data set to eliminate bubbles. In the static baseline environment, we can rely on experience to eliminate a bubble. However, once the underlying market parameters of liquidity, dividend uncertainty and unfamiliar faces have been altered to the rekindle values, experience is not a sufficient condition to eliminate the amplitude of a price bubble. From Table 5 , the Exact Wilcoxon Rank sum test for the null hypothesis that the rekindle duration is the same as inexperienced versus the two-sided alternative W=11, n=3, m=34, p-value=.0041; for rekindle versus twice-experienced it is W=27, n=3, m=8, pvalue=.0848. Result 2 in comparison with result 1 shows that there is a residual effect of experience on the market. While experience alone does not reduce the size of a bubble, it does reduce its duration. Participants seem to be tacitly aware that there will be a crash and consequently exit from the market (sell) earlier, causing the crash to start at an earlier period.
Result 3: Experience significantly reduces turnover. This does not carry over to the rekindle treatment. Turnover in rekindle is not significantly different than the turnover with inexperienced subjects.
The Exact Wilcoxon Rank sum test for the null hypothesis that the rekindle turnover is the same as inexperienced versus the two-sided alternative is W=31, n=3, m=34, pvalue=0.1647; for rekindle versus twice-experienced it is W=27, n=3, m=8, p-value = 0.0848. Result 3 is perhaps not surprising given the high level of cash-to-shares in the rekindle treatment. If investors are cash rich, they look for spending opportunities during the periods of disequilibrium. The Exact Wilcoxon Rank sum test for the null hypothesis that the Rekindle market value amplitude is the same as inexperienced versus the two-sided alternative is W=18, n=3, m=34, p-value = 0.0263; for Rekindle versus twice-experienced it is W=28, n=3, m=8, pvalue = 0.0485. Result 5 shows that the interaction between volume and amplitude is lessened with the rekindle experience relative to inexperienced subjects. However, there is a lingering effect since this scalar value is higher when Rekindle is compared to twiceexperienced subjects.
Results 1 -4 cast doubts on the robustness of experience including any 'error' that is eliminated by experience. New elements in the environment, not part of the world of the experienced population, rekindle major generic characteristics of these asset market bubbles.
The rekindling of the bubble can thus be a result of two forces: (1) the impact of the 'shock' involved in changing parameters between second and third experience, which induces a need for people to adapt to the new environment, and/or (2) The Exact Wilcoxon Rank sum test for the null hypothesis that the TwiceexperiencedNewRep duration is the same as twice-experienced versus the two-sided alternative is W=18, n=3, m=8, p-value = 1.0000; for Twice-experiencedNewRep versus rekindle it is W=6.5, n=3, m=3, p-value = 0.2000. Just as in result 2, result 6 shows that a residual effect of experience allows learning to transfer for duration despite the high liquidity, high dividend spread environment. Thus, bubbles do not last as long as traders gain more experience. However, there appears to be a greater transfer of learning under a static environment (as in New Replication) as opposed to an altered environment (as in Rekindle).
Result 7: Experience significantly reduces turnover. Turnover in Twice-experienced-New
Replication is significantly less than turnover with inexperienced traders.
The Exact Wilcoxon Rank sum test for the null hypothesis that the TwiceexperiencedNewRep turnover is the same as the inexperienced baseline is W=12, n=3, m=34, p=value = 0.0059. Result 7 suggests that experience is robust to a high liquidity, high dividend static environment in reducing turnover. Subjects learn through experience to trade less despite any increased temptation to spend their [higher] cash endowment.
Result 8: Market value amplitude is reduced with experience under the new parameters.
The Exact Wilcoxon Rank sum test for the null hypothesis that the TwiceexperiencedNewRep market value amplitude is the same as the twice-experienced baseline is W=25, n=3, m=8, p=value = 0.1939. Consistent with result 4, result 8 shows that the interaction between volume and amplitude is lessened over experience regardless of environment.
III. Conclusion
This study has focused on the robustness of learning and 'error' elimination on participants in a laboratory asset market and its effect on price bubbles. The results show that experience has a strong effect in a particular, commonly used stationary environment. Moreover, the results of DLM demonstrate that there exist environments in which experience can stifle the exuberance of inexperienced traders and squelch a bubble. Our results, however, while using the standard SSW environment, suggest that experience alone is not a sufficient condition to ensure the elimination of price bubbles.
In particular, when important elements in the underlying market environment change for experienced subjects, a bubble can reignite. But our control experiments establish that if the environment is one of high liquidity and high dividend spread, a bubble can be sustained in amplitude despite experience. Therefore, our shock effort to reignite bubbles with twice-experienced subjects is successful only in respect to the duration of a bubble; the high amplitude which reappears is more a function of the environment than the shock itself. As a byproduct of this effort we offer an enlarged database consisting of 81 experiments across three levels of subject experience with three different variations on the economic environment.
Experience, including possible 'error' elimination, is robust only to a very particular environment in determining the characteristics of a price bubble. Since experience changes with the turnover of investors, but also the underlying environment changes in national stock markets, we offer these new experiments as relevant for interpreting the relationship between laboratory and field asset market observations. (Table 4) Along with the data from our database, we report 10 replications of experiments under baseline parameters, 3 with the rekindle environment parameters using (mixed) subjects from these replications, and 9 New Replication experiments using the same rekindle environment parameters across all three experience levels (not mixed). NA Not applicable ¹ Subjects are drawn from the pool of 5 experienced, then mixed; in all others subjects are kept in the same groups across experience levels. 
